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An intrusion prevention system is a variation of an intrusion detection sys-
tem that drops packets that are anomalous based on a chosen criteria. An
intrusion prevention system is typically placed on the outer perimeter of a net-
work to prevent intruders from reaching vulnerable machines inside the network,
though it can also be placed inside the network in front of systems requiring ex-
tra security measures. Unfortunately, intrusion prevention systems, even when
properly congured, are susceptible to both false positives and false-negatives.
The risk of false positives typically leads organizations to deploy these systems
with the prevention capability disabled and only focus on detection.
In this paper I propose an expansion to current intrusion prevention sys-
tems that combines them with the principles behind honeypots to reduce false
positives while capturing attack trac to improve prevention rules. In an ex-
periment using the Snort-inline intrusion prevention system, I was able to re-
duce the rate of false positives to zero without negatively impacting the rate of
false-negatives. I was further able to capture a successful attack in a way that
minimized disruption to legitimate users but allowed the compromised system
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Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) are an extension of intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) that, rather than simply logging alerts, typically drop any net-
work trac that appears to be anomalous. IPSs are typically used on the outer
perimeter of a network to prevent any malicious trac from reaching potentially
vulnerable systems inside the network that may contain sensitive information.
In order to analyze the performance of an IPS, there are several parameters
that can be looked at, depending on what is most important to the network
the IPS is being deployed upon. The following parameters are commonly used
when discussing the ne tuning of any IPS and can be further used to analyze
the successfulness of any IPS.
• Latency - Latency is the time it takes for a packet to travel through the
IPS to the destination system and return to the user. This is typically
measured in round-trip time (RTT).
• False Negative - A false-negative is any malicious trac that makes it
through the IPS to the production network. A false-negative is dangerous
because it represents an instance where an attacker penetrates the network
and successfully exploits a vulnerable system.
• False Positive - A false-positive is any legitimate trac that the IPS drops
because it appears to be anomalous. A false-positive is harmful to a
network because it can deny legitimate users access to the oered services.
This can result in lost customers due to inaccessible services.
The two methods most frequently used in intrusion prevention systems are rule
based and anomaly based prevention. This paper focuses on the Snort-inline
IPS which uses rule-based prevention. Snort-inline is a customized build of the
Snort IDS which drops malicious trac based on a set of pre-specied rules.
As is common with many IPS systems, one of the steps taken when deploying
Snort-inline is to ne tune the rules to achieve the desired balance between
false-positives, false-negatives, and minimized latency.
A relatively unexplored method of intrusion prevention is to combine IPSs
with a form of honeypots utilizing bait-and-switch principles. Bait-and-switch is
a principle that exposes one system to users while convincing them they are using
a dierent system. Honeypots are great systems for analyzing the activities of
attackers. By oering attackers a vulnerable system to exploit, it is possible
to distract them from the full production system as well as to monitor their
activities to improve defenses and prevent any further attacks. A honeypot
typically has several layers of monitoring in order to capture any actions an
attacker takes. These layers include monitoring local activity on the honeypot
as well as network connections to the honeypot. A weakness of honeypots is that
there is no way to be sure an attacker will choose the honeypot over a system
in the production network, which can sometimes negate their usefulness. It
can also be costly to maintain a full honeynet (a network of honeypots), as it
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requires extra hardware and a great deal of eort to monitor logs. While the
principles of bait-and-switch are commonly used with malicious intent, it can
be a valuable principle in improving the outer defenses of a network.
In my system I utilize bait-and-switch principles in an IPS in order to trans-
parently reroute any anomalous trac to my honeynet. By doing this, the sys-
tem gains the advantages of a honeynet without requiring an attacker to nd
the honeynet. For my testing I created a set of poorly constructed set of Snort
rules based on network trac related to the phpBB forum that, in a typical IPS
would lead to dropped trac resulting in false-positives. In our hybrid system
the trac is rerouted to the honeynet, which will be referred to as the shadow
DMZ. The ultimate goal of this research was to develop a proof of concept for
a hybrid honeypot that is capable of reducing the rate of false-positives while
only having a minimal, if any impact on the rate of false-negatives.
1.1 Objective
1. Use a combination of tools to reduce false-positives in an Intrusion Preven-
tion System (Snort-inline) without removing rules between tests. Keeping
the rules for both sets of tests ensures that there is no reduction in false-
negatives.
2. The system must be capable of gracefully and automatically recovering
from attack.
(a) Gracefully - After attack there must be a compromised system to
analyze for evidence. In addition, the original system must be re-
turned to a safe state so that service interruption for legitimate users
is minimal.
(b) Automatically - The process of recovering from an attack should be
fully automated. This ensures that the attacker is instantly locked
out and services are restored without the delay of manual interven-
tion.
1.2 Limitations and Assumptions
The proposed system has the following limitations.
1. The system relies on the IPS to perform the bait-and-switch function. In
its current form, I only know of this functionality existing in Snort-inline.
2. IPS rules are still reliant on manual development. As a result, it is still
possible to circumvent the IPS through careful testing and probing. If a
rule does not exist to match against a set of packets, the trac will make
it to the production network whether it is malicious or not.
3. Although recovering from a successful attack against the Shadow DMZ is
automated, investigation of how the attack occurred is still manual.
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4. Because of the limitations of hardware and its ability to handle large
amounts of data, I developed a custom set of rules that would create
false-positives when trying to access the web front end, as well as a rule
to catch a directory traversal attempt. These rules did not directly reect
the available rules from Snort and other vendors.
The following assumptions and decisions were made that mitigate several of
these limitations.
Although the bait-and-switch capabilities only exist in Snort-inline, it is a
feature that could be added on to any IPS. With open source tools it is possible
that the community could write a third party tool to create the same function-
ality. In a proprietary IPS, the vendor would need to release this functionality
as an add-on feature.
The need to rely on manual development of rules is an inherent weakness of
most IPSs. With further development of this system, it may be possible that
rules could be automatically generated and rened based on attacks against
the network. While this system does not look to automate rule creation in an
IPS, it can improve the performance in anomaly based IPSs. By monitoring the
activity of anomalous trac in the Shadow DMZ, the network activity baseline
can be updated on a near real-time basis. Both of these topics are covered in
more depth in the future work section.
The third obstacle is tied to obstacle two and would require further devel-
opment beyond what this system hopes to achieve. There are tools that exist
that can monitor network trac and build rules based on attacks, but they were
only developed for specic honeypots. In the future one of these tools could be
modied or new tools can be developed to analyze the trac in the shadow
DMZ in order to create new rules and rene existing ones.
The fourth limitation does not have any eect on the validity of the tests.
The rules developed for testing were intentionally created to have a signicant
eect on the rate of false-positives in the rst phase of testing. In a production
network the rules, from whichever vendor is chosen, could be modied in the
same manner as in this research and achieve the same eect.
1.3 Contributions
This research makes the following contributions.
1. While the bait-and-switch preprocessor has been out for some time, I did
not see much discussion on its use for reducing false-positives in an IPS.
This research tests the ability of the tools to accomplish this goal in a way
that does not increase the rate of false-negatives.
2. The research also utilizes the advantages of virtualization to react to a
successful attack in a way that not only preserves evidence, but also re-
turns the system to a safe state in addition to blocking further attempts
by the same attacker. This is a process that could be reproduced in other
systems in order to gracefully recover from an attack.
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3. The proposed system provides a foundation for further research, especially
in the area of anomaly based intrusion prevention. There is also the op-
portunity to use this system to explore learning based intrusion prevention
systems through automated rule creation.
1.4 Chapter Summary
Chapter 2 discusses tools and similar articles that are related to this research.
Included are several of the tools that were used for this research including Snort-
inline, the bait-and-switch preprocessor, honeynets, and virtualization tools as
well as research related to the topic of shadow, or hybrid, honeynets.
Chapter 3 details the architecture of the network that I developed for test-
ing. This includes the architecture of a typical IPS protected network and the
network with the modied IPS.
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology I used for testing. It details how I
tested for false-positives as well as the method I used for tracking an attack and
recovering from it in a controlled manner.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results as well as the contributions that are made




In this chapter we analyze the tools that were used for this research. These
include Snort-inline, the bait-and-switch preprocessor, honeynets, and virtual-
ization tools. This is followed by a look at several articles that are relevant
to this work. While there has been a signicant amount of research related
to honeypots and intrusion prevention systems specically, the combination of
these tools with the purpose of reducing false-positives seems to be relatively
unexplored. It is important to understand the tools that the proposed system
was built on in order to understand how the proposed system will work.
2.1 Honeypots
While honeypots are in no way a new concept, their use in computer security
and information technology in general is relatively new. Two key resources to
study when planning a honeypot are articles published by Lance Spitzner as
well as articles from the Honeynet project. According to Spitzner, a honeypot
is an information resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that
resource.[12] While this is not exactly the denition that can be applied to the
shadow DMZ in my research, as it is also used by legitimate users, the proposed
system shares many of the properties of a honeypot. In the case of the proposed
system a honeypot is the system that receive the redirected suspicious trac.
The true value of any honeypot, whether the classic denition or the case in
this research, is in the data that is gathered during an attack.
There are several advantages that honeypots have over other intrusion de-
tection systems, but one of the greatest is the ability to log trac even in an
environment where trac is encrypted. This is possible because a majority of
the logging that takes place in a honeypot is local where the activity is no longer
encrypted. In the area of computer honeypots there are both low interaction
and high interaction honeypots, both with advantages and disadvantages.
2.1.1 Low Interaction Honeypots
A low-interaction honeypot works by emulating services and operating systems
in software. When attackers connect to a low-interaction honeypot, they are
essentially connecting to a script that responds with pre-dened responses.
In Spitzner's article on honeypots, he details the process of a specic low
interaction honeypot, honeyd, which works on the concept of monitoring unused
IP space[12]. When a request comes in for a service on an unused IP, as Spitzner
explains, honeyd grabs that request and, if it is emulating the requested service,
sends a response. Honeyd tracks all connections as well as requests and responses
in a log le for analyzing the activities of the attacker.
A weakness in honeyd is that it can only respond to requests that it is
programmed to recognize, and typically does not represent the full range of
functions that the emulated service can perform. An experienced attacker can
analyze the range of responses in order to determine if they are connected to
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honeyd. Spitzner suggests, because of the weaknesses in Honeyd, it is most
benecial in a corporate environment where the risk tolerance associated with
the honeypots is typically low.
In order to take advantage of the concepts introduced by Spitzner, I focused
on the software's ability to tunnel trac from the attacker to a physical system,
thus minimizing the limitations of Honeyd. In the proposed system, I wanted to
use the concept of tunneling to provide users with access to back-end resources
through an environment with extended monitoring capabilities.
Low-interaction honeypots are best in environments such as large corpora-
tions, where there is value in monitoring attacks, and a low threshold of risk
allowance. Because of the way low interaction honeypots are designed, it is pos-
sible for an attacker, through extensive ngerprinting, to determine all the IPs
on a corporate network that belong to the honeyd process, and thus specically
target production systems. The proposed system overcomes this weakness by
transparently redirecting suspicious network trac to the honeynet. An attacker
has no way of knowing if the system they are attacking is the true production
DMZ or the shadow DMZ.
2.1.2 High-Interaction Honeypots
The Honeynet project is a group dedicated to continued research of honeynets
and the tools associated both with implementing new honeynets and monitoring
trac within the honeynets. According to the honeynet project, high-interaction
honeypots are complex solutions as they involve real operating systems and
applications[12]. Whereas a low-interaction honeypot emulates services, a high-
interaction honeypot oers fully installed software and operating systems with
no limitations. While this can provide more valuable data, it has an added risk
of providing attackers a platform from which to launch further attacks if they
are able to compromise the honeypot.
According to Lance Spitzner, a honeynet is an architecture, an entire net-
work of computers designed to be attacked[12]. The concept behind a honeynet
is a highly controlled architecture that provides an attacker with a valuable as-
set to target while also providing the defender with an enhanced logging and
control capabilities.
The two key principles behind any honeynet are data control and data cap-
ture. Data control is important for limiting the risks of a honeynet and is
accomplished by limiting the actions attackers can take once they compromise
one of the machines in the honeynet. Data control is best accomplished by de-
ploying a gateway through which any data must pass either entering or leaving
the honeynet.
Data capture is central to any honeypot, as the reason for deploying any
honeypot is to log the activities of an attacker. Data capture is often accom-
plished in several layers, with packet captures at the gateway as well as local
logging capabilities on each of the honeypots. The proposed system follows all
of the principles of a high-interaction honeypot. Data control is achieved at the
gateway to the shadow DMZ. When an attack is detected, all further connec-
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Figure 1: Honeywall network diagram
tions from the attacking IP are blocked to prevent any further damage. Data
capture is achieved at the external gateway, as well as the shadow gateway. In
further expansions of the proposed system, it would be possible to achieve data
control at many other levels which would allow for greater correlation of data
in the event of an attack.
A new principle is introduced in the proposed system with the requirement
that the system must be capable of gracefully recovering from an attack. As
described earlier, a graceful recovery implies that there is both an image of the
system that can be used to analyze the actions of the attacker and a process
that returns the compromised system to a safe state in order to minimize the
impact on legitimate users.
The Honeynet Project maintains a pre-built honeynet called Honeywall which
provides all the necessary resources for an easy to deploy honeynet. Honeywall
comes in an ISO built on CentOS and is pre-congured with a number of tools
for data-control and data-capture.
Figure 1 shows a typical architecture of Honeywall with the external gateway
controlling the trac that passes to the honeynet and production networks.
Data control is accomplished at the Honeywall gateway with Snort-inline. The
gateway does not restrict trac as it enters the honeynet but does limit the
number of connections that can be made from within the honeynet to any system
outside the honeynet. If attackers take control of one of the systems inside
the honeynet, they cannot use it to launch further attacks. Data capture is
accomplished at several layers. At the gateway, Snort can be congured to log
trac that enters and leaves the honeynet. One of the most powerful monitoring
tools available in Honeywall is Sebek which is a kernel module that uses the
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principles of a rootkit. Sebek silently logs all local activity on the system on
which it is installed and sends the logs over UDP to the Honeywall gateway
where it is stored with logs from other systems and logging mechanisms. An
extra network interface can be added to the gateway for a connection that is
only accessible by a management system.
The Honeynet Project's Honeywall provided me with valuable insight into
how to construct the architecture for my system. The proposed system works
similarly to Honeywall with several key distinctions. In the proposed system
there is currently no system to centrally correlate data, but it would be relatively
simple to expand the proposed system to allow for central correlation of data.
In addition, the gateway in Honeywall transparently forwards all trac directly
to the honeypots. The proposed system takes the design of Honeywall and
puts the production DMZ behind an additional interface on the gateway. The
gateway then transparently uses Snort-inline similarly to how it is used on the
Honeywall gateway, but with the addition of the bait-and-switch preprocessor
to transparently route trac to the correct DMZ.
Honeypots, both low and high interaction, provided a signicant base on
which the proposed system is built. Many of the original principles of honeypots
persist in the proposed system, while new principles are added in order to achieve
the necessary goals.
2.2 Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that is designed to capture
intrusion attempts so that measures can be taken to limit damage and prevent
future attacks. This is typically accomplished by sending alerts anytime the
IDS detects an attack. IDSs can be broken down by where they gather their
data and how they check for attacks. An IDS can be either host-based or
network-based, meaning it either gathers data by listening to network trac
(network-based) or analyzing logs and other activities on a local machine (host-
based). In addition, a host-based or network-based IDS can be either rule-based
or anomaly-based. A rule-based IDS compares data against a predened set
of rules to detect attacks. This has the drawback of not being as capable of
detecting the latest vulnerabilities. With an anomaly-based IDS it is necessary
to establish a baseline of activity before nal deployment. The IDS then alerts
anytime it detects activity outside of this baseline. This can help in detecting
new attacks, but it can be dicult to keep the baseline up to date with what
should be expected, which can lead to an increase in false-positives.
In an article on the evolution of IDSs, Neil Desai discusses intrusion pre-
vention systems (IPSs) at dierent layers of networking. Intrusion prevention
systems further the functionality of IDSs by actively responding to attacks. An
IPS is any device (hardware or software) that has the ability to detect attacks,
both known and unknown, and prevent the attack from being successful.[2]
When an IPS detects an attack the typical reaction is to write the detected
activity to a log for a reference and drop the connection associated with the
attack. An inline network intrusion prevention system sits between the network
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Figure 2: Inline Network Intrusion Prevention System
to be protected and the outside network, silently monitoring the trac passing
between the networks.
An inline intrusion prevention system has at a minimum two network inter-
faces. As seen in Figure 2, these interfaces are typically bridged and are not
given an IP address so that an attacker does not have any way of targeting the
IPS. While inline IPSs such as Snort-inline are highly capable of catching known
exploits, they are not as successful at handling new and unknown attacks. Even
anomaly based inline IPSs are only eective when enough information is known
about the protocol to recognize activity that is out of the ordinary. This is the
leading cause of false-positives as well as false-negatives. When an IPS is tuned
to be more capable of catching newer attacks, it is likely to drop connections
that are legitimate. At the same time, many administrators counter this by
tuning the IPS to be less restrictive which leads to missing attacks that should
be recognized.
The proposed system uses the Snort-inline intrusion prevention system with
a preprocessor that was originally created by the developers as a cheap parlor
trick with the hope that it could someday be used for more eective purposes.
Snort-inline is used on the outward facing gateway in order to determine which
DMZ trac should be routed to. With further research it may be possible that
IPSs could further evolve to the point where the bait-and-switch capability is
found as a common option in products from most IPS vendors.
2.3 An Application Based Hybrid Honeynet
In an article entitled Detecting Targeted Attacks Using Shadow Honeypots,
Anagnostakis et al discuss a system they call a shadow honeypot which is used in
parallel with the IDS in order to further analyze the trac and make a decision
on how to handle it. When trac passes through the IDS, anything that is
considered anomalous is processed by a 'shadow honeypot' to determine the
accuracy of the anomaly prediction [1].
The shadow honeypot discussed in this article is similar to the honeypots
previously discussed, except that it is an application honeypot. The honeypots
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tested were modied versions of the Apache web server and the Mozilla Firefox
web browser which had additional logging capabilities as well as rollback capa-
bilities in case an attack was launched that changes the platform. The Apache
web server was deployed on a server farm in parallel with the production Apache
web servers. Any anomalous trac detected by the IDS was sent to the honey-
pot Apache web server and then underwent further analysis. If it was discovered
that the trac only appeared suspicious but was actually legitimate, the trac
was processed by the honeypot as if it was in the production system. If the
trac was an attack and any changes were made, the trac was cut o and
those changes were rolled back.
This system was useful in reducing false-positives, but because it was built
as an application level honeypot, it would have to be individually rebuilt for
each application that is to be monitored. This would have required extensive
customized code for each application as well as a way to coordinate all of the
information once it reached a certain level. In addition, the system from this
article was limited in its scope, as it could only detect attacks against Apache
or Mozilla Firefox.
The proposed system uses a similar concept to fool an attacker into attacking
a honeypot system rather than the production system, but can be used in more
general cases. The architecture from Anagnostakis et. al. only works with
applications that have been customized to perform more extensive logging and
act as honeypots which could be a signicant limitation. By creating the shadow
honeynet at the operating system level it is possible to deploy any application
or operating system as a honeypot with relative ease.
In addition to articles directly exploring honeypots, the Honeynet Project
has published a number of articles discussing the uses of honeypots, including
how a honeypot is used in a forensic analysis. When dealing with a forensic
analysis of a compromised system, the amount of live data that can be captured
can prove to be crucial in determining how an attacker got in and what actions
were taken. The more monitoring that is available to capture activity, the easier
it is to follow an attacker's activities. This includes local logs as well as logs
from the IDS and IPS. It is also important that the data collected is archived for
a period of time, as most attacks involve some type of information gathering
before the attack is launched[4]. The information gathering can take place
immediately before the attack or can occur over a more extended period of time
so as not to attract attention.
In the proposed system the extra monitoring in place provided data at every
level employing the honeypot principle of data capture in order to to make a
forensic analysis possible. In addition to the logs that are kept on each system,
logging is also performed by Snort-inline at the external gateway, as well as
the Snort IDS on the shadow gateway. Although it is still a manual process,
the correlation of this data provides a detailed trace of the attacker's actions.
The external gateway provides the data detailing why the attacker's trac was
initially sent to the shadow DMZ, while the shadow gateway reveals which data
from the attack caused the detection rule to re. In the future, with the addition
of a central log management server, it would be much easier to correlate all of
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this data in order to provide a more detailed timeline of the attacker's activity.
A related thesis by Yatish Mamniya provides an analysis of the false-positive
rate in Snort as an intrusion prevention system (Snort-inline) versus Snort as
an intrusion detection system. In the thesis, Mamniya discusses the rate of
false-positives that occur when running Snort inline, as well as the need for
ne tuning in an IPS. Mamniya's architecture has an external gateway running
Snort inline and iptables, as well as running Snort IDS on an internal gateway.
This made it possible to determine the trac entering the external gateway in
relation to the trac entering the internal gateway.
Mamniya measured several factors related to the performance of an IPS,
including the false-positive rate. A tool called the Distributed Internet Trac
Generator (D-ITG) was used to generate legitimate trac. Any trac from
D-ITG that was dropped by the IPS was deemed a false-positive. The results
of Mamniya's research showed a false-positive rate of over eighteen percent in
a tuned installation of Snort-inline. While I did not use this number as the
baseline for may research, it provided valuable insight into the nature of the
false-positive problem in IPSs.
The proposed system takes what was learned from this project with the goal
of reducing this false-positive rate and minimizing the amount of ne tuning
that is necessary in the IPS. By reducing the amount of ne tuning that is nec-
essary, intrusion prevention systems could become more eective in a corporate
environment as it would be easier to keep up with evolving attack trends.
While there was minimal research relating to the use of a hybrid honeynet
to reduce false-positives in, signicant work has been done with all of the com-
ponents that would go into such a system. By understanding these tools and
the principles that guide there use, it was possible to develop an architecture as
well as a set of principles and methodologies for the proposed system.
3 Architecture
Through the three phases of testing, the proposed system had two architectures.
The rst phase was guided by the research into intrusion prevention systems,
and represented a typical network with a DMZ that connected the outside world
to the private network through an external intrusion prevention system. In
the second and third phase of testing the architecture was more representative
of the Honeywall gateway from the Honeynet project with several additions.
The architecture included the production DMZ, the private network behind the
DMZ, as well as the shadow DMZ that received suspicious trac.
The rst step of this research was to set up a test system that would be
sure to exhibit false-positives but still be representative of an enterprise net-
work. This included an application that users could interact with, a database
on the back-end, and a separation of privately and publicly available networks.
As seen in Figure 3, the architecture required multiple layers in the network,
as the DMZ and private networks both ran on a VMWare ESXi server. There
was a basic architecture that existed in all the phases of the testing. On the
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Figure 3: Phase 1 architecture
outer perimeter of the network I set up a rewall running on CentOS 5. This
machine served as the gateway between the outside world and the internal net-
work. For testing purposes, the outside world was represented by any machine
in the 192.168.0.0/24 subnet. The rst level of the internal network was the
192.168.10.0/24 subnet. This subnet contained the management system, both
ESXi servers, and the external interface for each of the DMZ (second-level)
gateways. Each DMZ network had a gateway machine which acted as a rewall,
NAT router, and ran Snort as an IDS. Within the DMZ was a DNS server to
answer queries for the internal network, and a web server running phpBB and a
PHP script that opened the system to a directory traversal attack. A MySQL
server was set up in the private network as well as a Linux client machine.
Connections to the private network were restricted by the second-level gateway.
Between the three phases of testing changes were made to the base system to
reect the required environment.
3.1 Phase One
The goal of this phase was to create an environment that was somewhat repre-
sentative of a typical corporate environment and congure the IPS to generate
false-positives on a given set of trac. This allowed me to establish a baseline
for testing. Phase one of testing most closely reected the base setup as seen in
Figure 1. Trac from the outside world was NATed to the 192.168.10.0/24 sub-
net and was forwarded to the gateway at 192.168.10.5. Any trac that reached
the second-level gateway was NATed to the 10.0.1.0/24 and 10.0.0.0/24 subnets
with the former being the DMZ and the latter being the private network behind
the DMZ. Connections to the private network were limited by the gateway with
trac to the database server only being permitted if it originated from the web
server.
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The primary dierence from the base conguration was the setup of Snort-
inline on the external gateway. In phase one of testing the gateway was cong-
ured as a typical IPS. Any trac passing through the gateway that matched a
rule in Snort-inline was dropped. The rules used in Snort-inline were a custom
set of rules designed to create false-positives when a user interacted with PH-
PBB. Based on the custom set of rules, any attempted connection to index.php
script of PHPBB would result in all subsequent trac from the connecting IP
being dropped. While these rules would not likely be found in a corporate
network, they are representative of an instance where a systems administrator
might develop a poorly built set of rules that could at least for a period of time
lead to a signicant number of false-positives.
In addition to Snort-inline, the gateway also ran IPtables which was used in
conjunction with Snort-inline, as well as to perform NAT in order to translate
external IP addresses to the mid-layer private network addresses. Initially IPta-
bles did not serve any purpose other than NAT. In between the external gateway
and the DMZ gateway I set up a Windows XP machine solely for managing the
ESXi servers. This machine was not accessible from the outside world and did
not have any bearing on the results of the tests. I set up a second gateway on
the DMZ that performed a second level of NAT from the 192.168.10.0/24 subnet
to the 10.0.1.0/24 subnet. Two levels of NAT were necessary for this system in
preparation for the second phase where there would be two DMZs on separate
subnets. The DMZ gateway served as both a router and a rewall to protect the
private network. All trac entering the gateway was either redirected to the
DNS Server on port 53, the web server on port 80, or else it was dropped. Direct
connections to the private network were only permitted if they originated from
the web server and were destined for the database server on port 3306. Any
other connections directly to the private network were blocked by the rewall.
All connections from the private network to either the machines in the DMZ
or any machine in the outside world were permitted. Phase two expands the
architecture used in phase one in order to reect the proposed system.
3.2 Phase Two
The architecture in Figure 4 built upon the rst with some signicant modica-
tions. Snort-inline was recongured to use the bait-and-switch preprocessor in
order to reroute trac based on the rules in Snort. The shadow DMZ was set
up on the 10.0.2.0/24 subnet and was also connected directly to the external
gateway. The main principle was to set up the shadow DMZ to mirror the pro-
duction DMZ as closely as possible. This was simplied through virtualization,
as it was possible to create clones of the web server and DNS server as well as
migrate the copies to the shadow DMZ.
The gateway for the shadow DMZ had an external interface of 192.168.10.6
which was connected to the external network. It also had an internal interface
that provided connection to the web server and DNS server inside the DMZ.
The DNS server was authoritative for the *.thesis.local domain and answered
any requests that were forwarded by the external gateway. The web server had
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Figure 4: Phase 2 architecture
two interfaces, one at 10.0.2.3 and the other at 10.0.3.3 on the 10.0.3.0 subnet.
The second interface was a connection to the gateway on the production DMZ
and provided the connection between the shadow web server and the database
server in the private network. The rewall on the production DMZ gateway was
recongured to allow direct connections to the private network from both the
production and shadow web servers.
Snort was set up on the shadow DMZ gateway in order to monitor trac
in the DMZ. The goal of this IDS was to monitor trac exiting the network,
and the rules were specically designed to catch data that would be typically
seen in a compromised network. In this specic architecture this was a rule
that looked for a request for the /etc/passwd le. Specically, the rule looks for
the pattern 'root:0:0' which is a pattern that always exists in the /etc/passwd
le. To ensure that this match is the result of a directory traversal attack on
a web application, there is also a match in the rule requiring a 'GET' request.
Although this is a basic case, the purpose was to demonstrate certain features
of the proposed system and could easily be expanded to look for any other
sensitive les, as well as credit card numbers, connections on abnormal ports,
or username/passwords. In addition, because the shadow DMZ was set up so
that maintenance would simply be performed by re-cloning the machine from the
production DMZ, a written policy was established that no remote connections
should be made to the machines within the shadow DMZ. Policies such as this
could be implemented in the Snort rules to detect RDP, ssh, XTerm, and other
remote connections as attacks. A perl script was set up to run on an innite loop
in order to monitor the log from Snort looking for any new alerts and perform
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the necessary functions if one is added, as will be discussed in the next section.
Because of the use of NAT, attackers, or even regular users should have
no idea whether they are interacting with the production DMZ or the shadow
DMZ. It is likely that if this was used in an enterprise network, the machines
in the shadow DMZ would have less resources than the production machines.
This should not typically aect the performance, however, as the shadow DMZ
should see much less trac than the production DMZ depending on how the
rules are set up. Through virtualization it would be possible to build the shadow
DMZ on one piece of hardware which would greatly minimize the cost of such
an environment.
4 Methodology
In this chapter, I present the proposed methodology for reducing false-positives
as well as the steps that were taken to test the capabilities of the system. The
rst section covers the dierent aspects of the proposed system as well as how
it diers from a typical honeypot or IPS.
4.1 Hybrid Honeypot
The proposed system combines rewalls, intrusion prevention and detection
systems, and honeypots in order to achieve a lower false-positive rate than
a comparable intrusion prevention system. Before describing how the system
works, it is important to analyze exactly how each of the tools was used within
the network and why it was necessary.
4.1.1 Firewalls
There were several rewalls used in multiple layers in this network. On the
outer gateway that was between the outside world and the DMZ gateways was
the primary rewall. Due to some issues with virtualization there were two
gateways which sat inline with each other. The outer gateway ran IPtables
and had the sole function of translating trac from the 192.168.1.0/24 network
to 192.168.10.5 which was the IP for the external interface on the production
DMZ gateway. All trac passed through the second gateway which had bridged
interfaces with no IP. IPtables on this machine was used in conjunction with
Snort-inline and initially was congured with a basic accept all rule. The DMZs
used IPtables to perform NAT from the 192.168.10.0/24 network to their re-
spective internal networks. Filters were set up on both DMZ gateways so that
connections to the DMZs were only permitted on the required ports, in this case
80 for the web-server and 53 for the DNS server. In addition, the production
DMZ was set up to lter connections to the private 10.0.0.0/24 network. The
rules in this DMZ blocked all connections to the private network except for con-
nections from either the production web-server (10.0.1.3) or shadow web-server
(10.0.3.3) to the database in the private network over port 3306.
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preprocessor bait-and-switch: max_entries 200,log,insert_before
preprocessor bait-and-switch-ignorehosts: 10.0.0.0/8
Figure 5: snort_inline.conf bait-and-switch conguration
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
any (classtype:misc-attack; msg:"False posi-
tive1.";content:"GET";content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/template/styleswitcher.js";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6; sid:100001;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
any (classtype:misc-attack; msg:"False posi-
tive2.";content:"GET";content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/imageset/site_logo.gif";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6; sid:100002;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
any (classtype:misc-attack; msg:"False posi-
tive3.";content:"GET";content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/imageset/icon_topic_latest.gif";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6; sid:100003;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
any (classtype:misc-attack; msg:"False positive4."; con-
tent:"GET";content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/theme/images/bg_header.gif";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6;sid:100004;)
Figure 6: bait-and-switch rule conguration
4.1.2 Intrusion Prevention/Detection System
In this network I ran both an intrusion prevention system and an intrusion de-
tection system. The IPS, Snort-inline, was installed on the external gateway.
For Snort-inline I created a custom set of rules, as seen in Figure 6 aimed at cre-
ating clear false-positives. In addition to the custom set of rules, I congured the
IPS to use the bait-and-switch preprocessor by modifying the snort_inline.conf
le.
The rst preprocessor setting tells Snort the maximum amount of entries,
to log dropped packets, and to insert the new rewall rules created by the
preprocessor before all other rewall rules. This setting ensures that any trac
from the attacker is dropped. The bait-and-switch requires an added denition
in each of the rules that are to be used with the preprocessor which tells it where
trac should be rerouted to.
Snort-inline with bait-and-switch works by checking network trac against
the chosen set of rules and either sending the trac to its original destination
if a rule is not matched, or rerouting the trac to the shadow DMZ if a rule is
matched. The rerouting is accomplished by sending an SNAT and DNAT rule
to the rewall installed alongside Snort-inline. This new rule species that any
connection from the originating IP of the suspicious trac should be rerouted to
the shadow DMZ gateway at 192.168.10.5. Because trac is routed to one of the
two DMZs, there is no case where a connection can be blocked as a direct result
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alert tcp 192.168.10.6 80 -> any any (msg:"Successful directory traver-
sal"; content:"root:x:0:0:root:/root"; sid:100050;) alert tcp 192.168.10.6 80 ->
any any (msg:"Successful directory traversal"; content:"root:x:0:0:root:/root";
sid:100050;)
Figure 7: Snort Attack Detection Rule
of a rule ring on the IPS. In Figure 6, the snort_inline rules are modied to
include the setting 'bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6'. Bait-and-switch tells
the rule engine which conguration setting this is. The second setting is the
number of seconds that the rewall rule should exist, in this case 600 seconds.
The next setting tells Snort-inline to create an SNAT and DNAT rule and which
IP the trac should be rerouted to.
An IDS was also deployed on the shadow DMZ gateway listening on the
internal interface. The purpose of this IDS was to analyze trac leaving the
shadow DMZ for patterns that are common to a successful attack on a network.
The above example rule was the only attack rule I used in my IDS. This
rule looks through network trac for the pattern root:x:0:0:root:/root with
a source IP of 192.168.10.6 and a source port of 80 leaving the network. This
source IP and port means an alert should re for any web trac with this
pattern leaving the shadow DMZ for any external IP. The pattern chosen is
representative of text found in all /etc/passwd les. Alerts from this gateway
are how the network determines if a successful attack has taken place, which
leads to reactionary measures being taken. Other possible rules could look for
remote connections, cross-site scripting attacks, shell code and more. This is
safer than the drop rules at the IPS because the trac must go through several
layers and multiple matches before it is dropped. Only when this rule is matched,
is the attacker cut o from the network.
4.1.3 Handling Network Trac
In this section I will outline the steps that were taken by the proposed system
for legitimate trac, suspicious trac, and attack trac.
When legitimate trac reached the external gateway it was NATed from
the outside world (192.168.1.0/24) to the rst layer of the internal network
(192.168.10.0/24). Trac then transparently passed from the external gateway
through the second gateway which was running Snort-inline. If the trac did
not match any of the rules that Snort-inline was using, it was forwarded to the
gateway in the production DMZ at 192.168.10.5 where it was NATed to the
10.0.1.0/24 network for either the web-server or the DNS server.
Suspicious trac and attack trac began at the same stage as the legitimate
trac being NATed from the outside world to the 192.168.10.0/24 network. It
is important to note that attack trac is classied as suspicious trac when it
rst enters the network, thus it is treated the same as all suspicious trac. The
distinction between suspicious and attack trac is only made when the trac
leaves the shadow DMZ. When suspicious and attack trac passed through
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After trigger
DNAT all  <suspicious_ip> <external IP> <shadow DMZ>
SNAT all  <shadow DMZ> anywhere <external IP>
Figure 8: Bait-and-Switch example
Snort-inline on the second gateway, they were matched against one of the IPS
rules. As seen in Figure 8, the bait-and-switch preprocessor then created a new
rule in IPtables to NAT all trac from the originating IP to the 192.168.10.6
address which was the external interface of the gateway in front of the shadow
DMZ.
In the case of suspicious trac for the DNS server, it was simply rerouted
to the shadow DNS server in the same manner as it was in the production
DMZ, which then answered the DNS requests. Suspicious trac to the web
server arrived at the 10.0.2.3 interface which then made all database requests
through the 10.0.3.3 interface. These requests went through the production
DMZ gateway and were forwarded to the MySQL server.
As mentioned earlier, attack trac is handled dierently than suspicious
trac only in the nal phase. When an attacker succeeds in exploiting a vul-
nerability and the IDS at the shadow gateway detects a pattern in the trac
passing from the shadow DMZ to the attacker, several steps are taken. A basic
perl script was used which continuously read the alert le that was generated
by the IDS. The script simply checked the alert le for SID 100050 which was
a directory traveresal attack and then took action to cut o the attack.
The perl script took three steps. The rst step taken by the perl script was
to send a new rule to the Snort-inline gateway with a block rule to drop any
trac originating from or destined for the attacker IP. This step prevents the
attacker from making any further connections to either the shadow DMZ or the
production DMZ. Blocking trac destined for the attacker IP prevented the
compromised machine from sending any data to the attackers if they installed
any sort of program that was meant to track user data.
The second step taken by the perl script was to take a snapshot of the
compromised virtual machine. The purpose of the snapshot was to provide
valuable data for determining what actions the attacker took to compromise
the machine. This data can prove valuable for stopping future attacks.
The nal step was to revert the compromised machine back to a known safe
state. This allowed legitimate users to continue interacting with the system
with minimal downtime. This extended process not only reduced false-positives
in the production network, but also made it possible to monitor a successful
attack without endangering user information.
4.2 Testing
I tested the proposed system for both false-positives and false-negatives in two
phases each. The goal of the rst scenario was to develop a set of network
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trac that would be used for both phases of testing and to determine the rate
of false-positives and false-negatives for that set of network trac.
4.2.1 False Positives
In the rst phase of testing I used the initial architecture of the system. For this
test I requested '/phpBB3' which gave the main page of the forum application.
Using the custom Snort rules, I ran tcpdump on the external gateway and on
the production DMZ gateway. By comparing the packet capture in the external
gateway to the packet capture in the production DMZ gateway, I was able to
determine the rate of false-positives in the setup with Snort-inline. The results
showed that out of 23 network packets sent to the network, 13 were dropped
by Snort-inline. While this is a result of the rules that were used, which were
created to demonstrate a high rate of false-positives, it is not inconceivable that
an administrator might create a set of rules that would cause a higher rate of
false-positives.
In the second phase of testing I made the same requests for '/phpBB3'
against the proposed architecture. In using this method I was able to ensure
that any dierences in the false-positive rate were a direct result of the hybrid
honeypot. To determine the rate of false-positives, I again ran tcpdump on both
the external gateway and the production DMZ gateway, as well as the shadow
DMZ gateway. By comparing the trac on the external gateway to the trac
that passed through the gateways of both DMZs, it was possible to determine if
any trac was lost. A false-positive would be a case where network trac was
dropped without a block rule being created by a successful attack.
In addition to testing for false-positives it was also necessary to determine
the capabilities of the system to gracefully handle a successful attack. In both
DMZs I had a script, 'exploit.php', that was meant to simulate a script in an
application that could be exploited to reveal les on the remote host. Part of the
network trac from the rst phase was to make a GET request for 'exploit.php'
and set the 'lename' parameter to ../../../../../../etc/passwd. While I was able
to read the /etc/passwd le, I was unable to make any subsequent requests to
the desired resources. This test showed that the system was able to prevent
an attacker from taking advantage of a successful attack by creating a block
rule on the external gateway. After all the network trac had been replayed,
I opened the VM information for the shadow DMZ gateway to determine the
state of the virtual machine. The system successfully created a snapshot of the
exploited VM called 'Exploited' and reverted the VM back to the known good
state snapshot.
4.2.2 False Negatives
I used Nessus, a security scanner, to test for false-negatives. I chose a scan
policy that would create a signicant amount of trac that represented several
forms of attacks including directory traversals, cross-site scripting, sql injection,
and remote code execution. In advance, I treated all trac from Nessus as
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false-negatives to more easily distinguish the results. I performed the testing in
two phases, as I did in the test phase for false-positives.
In the rst phase of scanning, I chose the following plugin families to ensure
that the systems were properly detected and to create false-negatives.
1. Backdoors
2. CGI abuses
3. CGI abuses : XSS
4. DNS
5. Web Servers
The CGI and DNS plugins were chosen because they mostly target ports 53 and
80 which are the only ones that are open on the DMZ gateway. The CGI plugins
also have a large number of plugins that actually attempt an exploit which
would be the best way to trigger a false-negative. The backdoor plugin family
was chosen to generate more attack trac. In addition to these plugin families,
I also enabled web application testing which attempts cross-site scripting and
sql injection attacks against the web applications on the target system.
In order to determine the signicance of false-positives in the system, I ran
Wireshark on the Nessus scanner, and tracked the number of alerts generated
by the Snort-inline gateway. In both phases of testing, there were around 50000
packets sent to the target systems. Of the packets that were generated by the
scanner in the rst round of testing, a total of arund 10000 alerts were triggered
on the gateway. Because of the set up of these system, the remaining packets are
considered false-negatives, though a signicant number could be from version
detection plugins which would not generate an alert.
The second round of false-negative testing was performed by using Nessus
to ensure the same services and vulnerabilities were detected by running the
same scan policy in its second phase of the architecture. I this second round
of false-negative testing, a total of around 12000 alerts were triggered on the
gateway resulting in less false-negatives. Although it would seem that the same
number of alerts should be generated between the two systems, with some of the
CGI and web application testing against the rst phase, the connection would
likely have been dropped once the attack had been detected which is not the
case in the second phase. In addition, the web application testing does not
always create the same values for parameters, which could potentially cause
small dierences in the number of alerts generated.
4.3 Dierentiating Between Suspicious and Attack Trac
An important detail that has not been discussed completely is how we dieren-
tiate between suspicious trac and attack trac. Any trac that ends up in
the shadow DMZ is automatically considered suspicious trac. All future traf-
c from the originating host is considered suspicious for ten minutes, though
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DNAT all  192.168.0.108 192.168.0.55 192.168.10.6
SNAT all  192.168.10.6 anywhere 192.168.0.55
Figure 9: IPtables NAT rules
this can be congured as needed for the desired environment. The determina-
tion of whether trac is attack trac is made on the shadow DMZ gateway.
This system has Snort installed with rules based on common patterns seen in
attacks. In the case of my test system, it was set up with only one rule designed
to detect a successful directory traversal attack where the attacker retrieves the
'/etc/passwd' le from the target system. When an attack is detected, as dis-
cussed previously, a script which runs in a continuous loop automatically sends
a block rule to the external gateway to block the attacker IP, and takes a snap-
shot of the compromised machine. A log was kept to track the Snort logs which
were used to determine which exploit the attacker used. Because of the design
of the rules on the shadow DMZ, any trac that triggered a rule was assumed
to be an attack. This is a relatively safe assumption as it required the trac to
trigger a rule on both the external gateway in order to be considered suspicious,
as well as trigger a rule on the shadow gateway to be considered an attack. It
was unlikely that legitimate trac would trigger rules on both gateways, espe-
cially as the rules on the shadow gateway were typically only seen in the event
of a successful attack.
5 Results and Future Work
In this section we analyze the results from the testing and look at how this
system could be used as a basis for future work.
5.1 Results
The results of the testing were based on two scenarios. The rst scenario was
legitimate trac that appeared suspicious due to a poorly written set of rules.
The second scenario was meant to represent an instance where an attacker nds
a directory traversal vulnerability in a PHP script that could be exploited to
read arbitrary les on the aected host.
Scenario one represented a case in which a set of seven rules were created
to block access to certain portions of the phpBB forum application. In the rst
phase of testing, out of the 23 packets sent to the network, 13 were dropped by
Snort-inline. This amounted to a false-positive rate of over fty percent. All
trac in this phase that was deemed suspicious was immediately dropped. In
the second phase of testing, the same trac was replayed against the network.
The rst set of packets did not match against the Snort rules and were therefore
routed to the production DMZ. After the initial set of packets, a request was
made for a phpBB page which caused a Snort-inline rule to re. The result was
the addition of a new NAT rule in IPtables, as can be seen in Figure 9.
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INPUT Table
DROP all  192.168.0.108 anywhere
FORWARD Table
DROP all  192.168.0.108 anywhere
Figure 10: IPtables rules to cut o the attacker.
This rule caused all trac from the IP 192.168.0.108 to be routed to the
shadow DMZ. One aw that I encountered was that after the new rule was
created, I had to reload the page in order for it to be successfully loaded. I
suspect this was due to the shadow web server not being aware of the existing
connection. Despite this aw, after reloading the page any further interaction
worked as if the connection was being routed through the production DMZ.
Because of the requirement to reload the page, a total of 55 packets were sent to
the test network. Of these 55 packets all were routed to either the production or
shadow DMZ with none being dropped. Although a page reload was required,
the results still demonstrate a zero percent false-positive rate. These results
could be achieved whether using the rule set from this test, or another rule set
that is customized to include the bait-and-switch conguration.
The second scenario was designed to emulate a situation where an attacker
discovers and exploits a directory traversal vulnerability to gain access to the
'/etc/passwd' le on the web server. In the rst phase of testing, the request
for '/exploit.php?lename=../../../../../../../etc/passwd' caused the packet to
be dropped. This was typical of an IPS and successfully prevented the attack.
The issue, however, was how to prevent or mitigate the eects of this attack
without preventing legitimate trac.
The second phase of testing demonstrated that it was possible to mitigate
the eects of the attack. Again, as in the second phase of testing for the
rst scenario, the request '/exploit.php?lename=../../../../../../../etc/passwd'
matched on a rule in Snort-inline and caused a new NAT rule to be added to the
rewall that ran alongside Snort-inline. At this point, the request was classied
as suspicious trac and was routed to the shadow DMZ. The request reached
the shadow web server which processed the request and returned the contents
of the /etc/passwd le. As the contents of the '/etc/passwd' le passed through
the shadow gateway, the Snort rule to detect the contents of the /etc/passwd
red and wrote to the alert.log le. The snortwatch.pl script detected this new
alert in the alert.log le and initiated a graceful recovery from the attack. Two
new IPtables rules were added as the rst rules on the outermost Firewall, as
can be seen in gure 10.
This immediately prevented attackers from taking advantage of the success-
ful attack by cutting them o from the network. The second set created a
snapshot of the compromised web server with the name 'compromised'. The
nal step was to revert the web server to a safe snapshot that was taken dur-
ing the setup phase on all virtual machines. In total it took about one minute
from the time of the attack to the completion of reverting to the safe snapshot.
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During this time there was limited access to the shadow web server, though this
is necessary to return the system to a safe state without losing the evidence
of the attack. The nal limitation is not as signicant. I chose not to explore
latency as it did not have any bearing on the rate of false-positives. Because
of the way the system relies on an add-on tool, rather than a modication of
rules, to reduce false-positives, it does not increase the rate of false-negatives.
Any false-negative that exists in the researched system would also exist in an
IPS without the added tools.
The result of the false-negatives testing showed that there was no impact on
the rate of false-negatives caused by the new system. In the rst test phase I saw
a total of around 10000 packets that were determined to be false-negatives. In
the second phase of testing, with identical trac, I saw close to the same number
of alerts, in this case 12000, logged which led to an lower rate of false-negatives,
thogh as mentioned earlier in the paper, this could have several causes and the
rate of false-negatives between the two systems will be at a minimum equal.
By running Nessus in both phases of testing, I was also able to determine that
the same vulnerabilities were found between the two test phases. In addition,
because none of the trac was successful in obtaining the '/etc/passwd le', the
graceful recovery process was never initiated, as this process should only occur
if an attack is successful. As discussed before, the rate of false-negatives was
unaected because the same rules were used between the two test phases, and
the only change was to include the bait-and-switch preprocessor.
The results demonstrated several achievements. Most signicantly, the sys-
tem reduced the false-positive rate to zero without having an eect on the rate
of false-negatives. The results also showed a graceful process to recover from
attack so that the exploit could be analyzed while legitimate users could safely
continue to interact with the systems. While these results were promising, they
presented only a start, as the proposed system could be expanded in many ways
to provide better protection for the network, while also providing increased
capabilities for monitoring attacks.
5.2 Future Work
While the results of testing were promising, there are several elds that these re-
sults could be applied to in order to improve the capabilities of the system. Due
to the availability of the bait-and-switch preprocessor, the only IPS used was
Snort-inline which is a rule-based intrusion prevention system and is therefore
only as eective as the rules that are in place.
5.2.1 Further Testing
The tests I performed against this systems were only intended to demonstrate
the capabilities of the systems. To further this research it would be interesting
to set up a system, with a full set of rules, connected to the Internet and let
attackers compromise the system. This would give a better idea of how much
trac would likely be routed to the shadow network.
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Another aspect to explore in expanding this system would be to use a full
set of prevention rules on a network and monitor the rules to determine which
ones are causing the most false positives. This could be accomplished by only
placing the bait-and-switch option in rules that are not exact attack signatures.
If a lot of trac enters the shadow network but does not cause a compromise,
it may be necessary to re-examine the rule and modify it to reduce its chances
of false positives. This could be most useful in a network where the security
group creates custom rules that need to be tested, by allowing applying the
rules against live trac without risking blocking customer trac.
A nal avenue that I looked at briey but decided was not necessary for
the purposes of the research was to have two databases, one in the production
network and one in the shadow network. The shadow network database would
only contain public data and would not pose a risk if it were compromised. This
poses several diculties, especially in the synchronizing of data without expos-
ing private data to the shadow network. There would have to be a way for users
in the shadow network to interact with the shadow network without knowing
they were working against a separate set of data. In addition to further testing
and modication of the proposed system, there are several ways to expand its
capabilities that could make it much more eective.
5.2.2 Anomaly Based IPS
As discussed earlier, an anomaly based IPS works by analyzing trac against a
baseline of network activity. The drawback of a system such as this is that, over
time, typical network activity changes and it can be dicult to keep the baseline
on level with what should be expected, leading to an increase in both false-
positives and false-negatives. While this research demonstrated the possibility
of signicantly reducing false-positives in a rule based IPS, the same capabilities
could be used to create a constantly evolving baseline in an anomaly based IPS.
The baseline would initially be created in the same manner as is seen in a typical
IPS. Any activity that is deemed anomalous would be rerouted to the shadow
DMZ. This trac would be further analyzed over a period of time to determine
the nature of the trac based on a certain set of criteria set forth by the security
administrators. If after a designated period of time no attack was discovered,
the baseline could be modied to take into account the anomalous trac so that
in the future it would no longer be considered anomalous. At the same time any
attack trac that is aimed at the network would be sent to the shadow network
and would be handled in the same manner as in the proposed system. While it
is feasible that an attacker could still penetrate this system, it would require a
much more coordinated and sophisticated attack over a long enough period of
time to make the attack trac appear legitimate. This extended attack would
leave a signicant footprint that could be used for the purposes of tracking down
the attackers.
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5.2.3 A True Learning IPS
A rule-based IPS is only as eective as the rules that are built into the system.
These rules are either static or slow to evolve due to the requirement of human
involvement. Most rule-based IPSs can be bypassed by altering the code enough
or passing dierent parameters so that the trac does not match any of the rules
in the IPS. This sort of attack becomes more likely when rules are constructed
to reduce false-positives.
The proposed shadow honeynet could be extended to 'learn' from malicious
trac. As before, legitimate trac would be treated the same as in the research.
The 'learning' would occur in the shadow DMZ when an attacker successfully
exploits a vulnerability. Similar to the tool Honeycomb, signatures would be
added to Snort-inline based on results discovered after an attack. Honeycomb
works specically with honeyd to create signatures based on logged activity.
Using the shadow honeynet, the data available for creating new rules would be
much more extensive.
The process, which would work similar to the current system when an attack
occurred, would use a central log correlation system. Following a successful
attack, the script monitoring trac exiting the network would query the central
log system for all data relating to the attack. This data would be used to create
a rule on the IPS which would monitor future trac for similar patterns to those
found in the logs. These rules could be applied to both the network intrusion
prevention system that monitors trac entering the network, but could also be
used to create new rules on host based intrusion prevention/detection systems.
By learning from attacks rather than just blocking the attacker, it is possible
to prevent access to vulnerabilities in applications without preventing access to
the application itself.
6 Conclusion
The research presented here demonstrates a proof of concept for a shadow hon-
eynet that is designed to reduce false-positives while having a minimal, if any,
impact on the false-negative rate. While a pre-chosen set of network trac had a
near 50% false-positive rate in the rst test phase, the same network trac sent
to the network with the shadow honeynet had zero false-positives. In addition,
I demonstrated the capability of the system to gracefully and automatically re-
cover from a successful attack. A graceful recovery was dened as having a copy
of the compromised system that could be used for a forensic analysis as well as
returning the compromised system to a safe state so that it could be used by
legitimate users. Being automated implies that the system was able to recover
from the attack without any human interaction. The proposed system goes a
long way in reducing false-positives without reducing false-negatives and opens
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A Snort-inline Rules Phase 1 - No bait-and-switch
# Custom made rules to generate false-positives.





drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 2."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/imageset/site_logo.gif";
sid:100002;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 3."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/imageset/icon_topic_latest.gif"; sid:100003;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 4."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/theme/images/bg_header.gif";
sid:100004;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:attempted-
recon;
msg:"Directory traversal detected."; content:"GET";
content:"../etc/passwd"; sid:100005;)
B Snort-inline Rules Phase 2 - Bait-and-switch
enabled
# Custom made rules to generate false-positives.
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 1."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/template/styleswitcher.js";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6; sid:100001;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 2."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/imageset/site_logo.gif";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6; sid:100002;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;




drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:misc-
attack;
msg:"False positive 4."; content:"GET";
content:"/phpBB3/styles/prosilver/theme/images/bg_header.gif";
bait-and-switch:600,src,192.168.10.6;sid:100004;)
drop tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (classtype:attempted-
recon;




# bait-and-switch: Attempt to do stealthy reroutes of an attacker to a honeypot
for x number of seconds
# -
# For use in rule language
# reroute packets from attackers for x number of seconds because we don't
like them messing with
# our stu.
#
# In the example below the rst line tells bait-and-switch a max amount of
entries for memory allocation
# In addition the rst line tells bait-and-switch to log droped packets to the
snort log dir bands.log,
# and to insert reroute rules before anything else that may be in your
postrouting/prerouting chains via insert_before
#
#
# The second line tells which sources to never reroute it is very, very im-
portant to add your home net
# and you dns servers to this list.
#
#example:
preprocessor bait-and-switch: max_entries 200,log,insert_before
preprocessor bait-and-switch-ignorehosts: 10.0.0.0/8
D Shadow Gateway Snort rules




# This le intentionally does not come with signatures. Put your local
# additions here.
alert tcp 192.168.10.6 80 -> any any (msg:"Successful directory traversal";
content:"root:x:0:0:root:/root"; sid:100050;)
E Snortwatch.pl












print "Line: " . $line;










print "SID: " . $sid . "\n";
my $vm_name;
my $ssh_con = Net::SSH2->new();
$ssh_con->connect('192.168.10.1') or die;
if ($ssh_con->auth_password('root', 'p@ssw0rd')){
print "SSH Connection Made";
my $chan = $ssh_con->channel();
$chan->exec("iptables -I INPUT -s $dst_ip -j DROP");
$chan=$ssh_con->channel();
$chan->exec("iptables -I FORWARD -s $dst_ip -j DROP");
$vm_name="ShadowWeb";
$cmd_snap = 'perl /root/vmware-viperl-distrib/apps/vm/vmsnapshot.pl 
server 192.168.10.201 username root password p@ssw0rd';
$cmd_snap = $cmd_snap . " vmname $vm_name sname compromised";
$cmd_revert = 'perl /root/vmware-viperl-distrib/apps/vm/snapshotmanager.pl
operation goto server 192.168.10.201 username root password p@ssw0rd';
$cmd_revert = $cmd_revert . " vmname $vm_name snapshotname -
nalstate";
$cmd_power = 'perl /root/vmware-viperl-distrib/apps/vm/vmcontrol.pl 
server 192.168.10.201 username root password p@ssw0rd operation poweron';
$cmd_power = $cmd_power . " vmname $vm_name";
system($cmd_snap);
system($cmd_revert);
system($cmd_power);
}
}
}
}
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